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Banking malware is malicious software that aims to steal money from victims via manipulated bank 
transfers in online banking. This paper describes how the profits of banking malware are generated 
and subsequently laundered, with a particular focus on the use of bitcoins and other digital payment 
methods. Computers are infected with banking malware via phishing e-mails, in which people are 
persuaded in various ways to click on links or open attachments, or via exploit kits, programs that try 
to find weak spots in the security of computer systems. After infection, bank transfers of the online 
banking accounts of victims are manipulated via fake website screens (web injects). Behind the screens 
the amounts and beneficiaries of transactions are modified, emptying the victims’ bank accounts. In 
the next step, the banking malware profits are laundered. In this paper we describe two models that 
are used in particular (next to more traditional money laundering methods). The first model involves 
the use of money mules and a quick cash-out. The second model focuses on direct spending via (A) 
direct purchases of products via online shopping, (B) direct purchases of Bitcoins via Bitcoin exchanges 
or (C) direct purchases of luxury goods. Bitcoins can be further laundered via so-called mixing services. 
All in all, these methods allow criminals to launder profits in relative anonymity and prevent seizure of 










Despite a lot of research on money laundering of profits of traditional crime such as drug trafficking 
(Savona 2005; Schaap 1998), relatively little is known about the money laundering of cybercrime. 
Whereas in traditional crime the profits are often in cash, cybercrime profits are often generated in 
the form of electronic money (i.e., digital euros, dollars, etc. on online bank accounts). Furthermore, 
in the area of cybercrime, there exists valuable research on financial cybercrime, phishing and related 
areas, but most of it focuses on the victims of cybercrime (Anderson 2006; Choi 2008; Harrell and 
Langton 2013; Leukfeldt 2014; Leukfeldt 2015; Jansen and Leukfeldt 2016; Ngo and Paternoster 2011, 
Vishwanath et al.2011; Van Wilsem 2011), whereas research on the cybercriminals and their methods 
is limited. In this paper we try to add to existing knowledge and literature by focusing on the laundering 
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of cybercrime profits and the methods cybercriminals use for this. We focus specifically on the profits 
of banking malware, a type of financial cybercrime that uses malicious software (or ‘malware’ in short) 
that aims to steal money from victims via manipulated bank transfers in online banking. 
Banking malware has been one of the most prominent threats in the area of cybercrime in recent years 
and cybercriminals generate large profits with banking malware (Europol, 2015a: 7). In July 2015, it 
was reported that a group of cybercriminals generated profits amounting to a hundred million euro 
with banking malware between 2005 and 2014 (Sandee 2015: 3). Although banks have taken several 
measures to address and mitigate this threat, their clients are still being attacked by cybercriminals on 
a daily basis. 
Similar to other crimes in which criminals aim to make profits, in the case of banking malware and 
other types of financial cybercrime it is necessary to launder the generated profits. When the profits 
are not laundered, its origins can easily be traced and this may increase the likeliness that the 
cybercriminals will be caught. In the case of banking malware, it is electronic money that has to be 
laundered in order to conceal its illegal origins and prevent seizure of the profits.  
In this paper we will provide an answer to the key question: “how are the profits of banking malware 
generated and subsequently laundered?” In answering this question, we will particularly focus on the 
role of bitcoins and other digital payment methods. For instance, Europol signals a shift from the use 
of more traditional payment methods towards digital payment methods, such as Bitcoin, that offer 
more anonymity (Europol 2015a: 30).  
This paper is structured as follows. In the second section we describe the methodology used in our 
research. In the third section we describe what banking malware is and how it works. In the fourth 
section we identify two different models that are used for the laundering of banking malware profits, 
illustrated by a real police case in one of the police files we encountered in our research. In the fifth 





The key question of this paper was answered in a research project that was carried out by the authors 
when working for WODC, the Research Centre of the Ministry of Security and Justice in the Netherlands 
(Oerlemans et al. 2016). This research was requested by the Team High Tech Crime of the Dutch 
National Police, who wanted to have more background knowledge both on how profits of financial 
cybercrime are laundered and the roles of different actors involved in the money laundering processes. 
The question in this paper was answered by applying various research methods. Apart from desk 
research – focusing on existing relevant literature on cybercrime, banking malware, bitcoins, virtual 
currencies and money laundering - a series of 20 interviews were conducted and a total of four police 
files with criminal cases were investigated. The research was carried out in 2016. 
The desk research focused on an analysis of available literature and relevant media messages in order 
to collect background information on (the relations between) cybercrime, money laundering and 
digital payment methods. The literature was also used to validate results from the other research 
methods. 
The interviews consisted of a series of twenty semi-structured interviews with (mainly Dutch) experts 
in the areas of cybercrime, money laundering and the use of digital payment methods. These experts 
are mainly active in law enforcement, banks and financial institutions and the digital payment services 
industry. Six interviewees are affiliated to the largest commercial banks in the Netherlands. One 
respondent works for the Dutch national bank. One person is employed at Bitonic, a bitcoin exchange 
based in the Netherlands. Nine interviewees are active in law enforcement, including one person from 
Europol, three persons from the public prosecution service, three persons from the national police 
(from the Team High Tech Crime) and two persons from the FIOD, the fiscal intelligence and 
investigation service of the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration. Two interviewees are 
affiliated with Fox-IT, a private company focusing on cyber security. One interviewee is affiliated with 
Mollie, a private company specialized in online payment methods.  
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The list of questions used for the interviews consisted of three major topics. The first topic concerned 
cybercrime, particularly banking malware, with questions on how the respondents view banking 
malware, ways in which infection with malware takes place, current and near-future developments, 
and typologies of perpetrators. The second topic was on money laundering, particularly via 
cryptocurrencies, with questions on past, present and future constructions of money laundering, the 
payment methods used, the role of cryptocurrencies in the money laundering, and the role of online 
market places, money mules and other actors possible involved in money laundering. The third topic 
was on combating money laundering, with questions on proving intent, gathering evidence for money 
laundering, anti-money laundering measures, the prosecution of money laundering as a separate 
charge (apart from the cybercrime itself), measures envisioned or needed to better fight money 
laundering, and new anti-money laundering legislation. 
Not all interviewees were asked the same set of questions. Rather, depending on the background and 
expertise of each interviewee, a subset of the list of interview questions was used in each interview. 
The interview results were used to generate knowledge on the use of digital payment methods in 
digital money laundering processes of the banking malware profits. 
In cooperation with the Dutch National Police and the Public Prosecution Service, four police files 
concerning cybercrime and money laundering were investigated. The cases were selected because 
they involved banking malware and/or the use of Bitcoins. The information in the police files concerns 
information on digital money laundering methods and characteristics of actors involved. Three cases 
concerned banking malware, one case concerned ransomware. In all cases Bitcoins were used in the 
money laundering process and in some of the cases Webmoney, PayPal, Ukash, Vouchers, Western 
Union, MoneyGram and other digital payment methods were used. In one case, MegaServer, most of 
these digital payment methods were used. This case is described in Section 4.3. 
 
 
Banking malware: how it works 
 
A thorough understanding of the workings of banking malware is required in order to understand how 
the profits are generated. Cybercrime may be defined as ‘criminal acts committed using electronic 
communications networks and information systems or against such networks and systems’ (European 
Commission 2007: 2; Wall 2007)). This approach clearly distinguishes between tool cybercrimes (i.e., 
types of cybercrime that use electronic communication networks and information systems) and target 
cybercrimes (i.e., types of cybercrime that are targeted against electronic communication networks 
and information systems) (Koops 2014: 214; cf. Charney 1994; cf. Parker 1976: 17-22).  
Target cybercrimes specifically focus on the integrity, confidentiality and availability of such networks 
and systems. The most obvious example is illegal access, often referred to as ‘hacking’ (Décary-Hétu 
and Dupont 2012; Dupont et al 2016). This is a criminal offense under Article 2 of the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe 2001). The illegal access may concern 
computers, but also Internet of Things devices (Atzoria et al. 2010). A variety of approaches may yield 
such unauthorized or illegal access. Examples include misleading or persuading victims to provide log-
in details, crunching passwords with computer power or abusing software vulnerabilities (Bernaards 
et al. 2012: 29-34). Criminals may also use malicious software (‘malware’) to gain unauthorized access 
to computers from a distance. Creating and disseminating such malware is also a criminal offence 
according to the Convention on Cybercrime.1 
Malware can have different functionalities. Examples include keylogging (recording all strikes on the 
keyboard), backdoors (remote access to computers via pre-programmed backdoors) and Remote 
Administration Tools (RATs) (Europol 2015a: 21-25) that can remotely control computer systems and 
can turn on and off functions like webcams and microphones from a distance. Computers infected with 
malware that are remotely controlled by other computers are part of so-called botnets (Bernaards et 
al. 2012; 45). These botnets may be useful for their computing power, for instance, to start DDoS 
attacks, crunch passwords, crack encryption or mine Bitcoins. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3411486 
4 
 
Tool cybercrimes focus on the facilitating role that the internet and computer systems may play. 
Deception and fraud are crimes that increasingly take place online (Clough 2010: 372-373). Online 
scams often concern phishing (Lastdrager 2014), a scam in which criminals try to obtain personal data 
in order to later abuse these data. According to our interviewees, phishing has been considerably 
professionalized in recent years (CSBN 2016: 45). Via fake e-mail messages, victims are requested to 
visit a copy of their online banking website to verify their account. After people have entered their 
name and account details, they are contacted by a (fake) bank employee and persuaded via ‘social 
engineering’ to disclose their PIN codes or to make specific payments.2 Spear-phishing is another 
method, consisting of a targeted attack on an individual or company using personal data that is already 
known by the attackers (Bernaards et al. 2012: 58-59). Money laundering via digital or virtual 
currencies can also be considered a tool cybercrime, as computers and the internet are tools used to 
commit these crimes. Case law in the Netherlands shows that criminals committing these offences are 
often convicted for traditional theft.3 
 
Next to malware via phishing e-mails, computers can also be infected with the use of so-called exploit 
kits. These are programs that try to find weak spots in the security of computer systems and then install 
the malware. This may happen when victims did not take adequate security measures, such as using 
passwords, firewalls and anti-virus software. Research has shown that, even though people take 
measures to protect themselves against online banking fraud, most victims are unaware of the scam 
that they fell victim to prior to the incident (Jansen and Leukfeldt 2016). People also report to have 
insufficient knowledge and skills regarding the safety and security of online banking and find it difficult 
to assess to what extent protective measures help them to safeguard against fraudulent attacks 
(Jansen and Leukfeldt 2016; Custers et al. 2014). 
After a computer is infected with the banking malware, the malware starts doing what it was designed 
for. Usually this involves manipulating the bank transfers that the victim makes with his or her online 
banking account. The malware often makes use of so-called web injects, fake website screens that 
pretend to be a user’s online banking environment. The malware may allow cybercriminals to 
manipulate the web browsers of their victims and show these fake screens, for instance, when the 
victims try to enter their online banking environment (Sandee 2015: 16-18). The malware recognizes 
the name of the bank or the URL the victim is searching for and guides the victim to the fake website 
that the cybercriminal has created (Bernaards et al. 2012: 43). The fake websites may be very hard to 
distinguish from the real websites for online banking. When the victim wants to transfer money to 
another account, behind the screens the amount and the beneficiary are modified.4 This type of attack 
is also referred to as a man-in-the-browser-attack (Tajalizadehkoob 2013: 25). Sometimes waiting 
screens are used to keep the victim waiting while the transaction is prepared and executed. A typical 
business model for cybercriminals is to buy and disseminate the malware (which costs approximately 
3.000 dollars) and then generate profits by emptying the bank accounts of victims (on average 722 
dollar per victim), with total profits running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars to millions of 
dollars (Ilyin 2014). 
 
Many banks have a two factor identification system that requires, apart from log-in details like a 
username and password, an authentication code. This may be, for instance, a code sent via a mobile 
phone text message or a code generated by a special device (often in combination with the credit or 
debit card). These codes can be intercepted by the criminals via malware (for instance, when mobile 
phones are also infected with the malware) or by directly contacting the victims (for instance, by 
opening a chat screen or another type of pop-up screen, or by calling them, pretending to be a bank 
employee) (Sandee 2015: 17-18). The trade in credit and debit cards with related codes is referred to 
as ‘carding’ (Peretti 2008). 
A lot of banking malware has several different functionalities and is not only aimed at stealing log-in 
details of online banking accounts of victims. The malware, for instance, also tries to collect other 
personal data by attacks based on particular keywords like popular electronic communication services 
and payment services (Binsalleeh et al. 2010). Also, some malware offers the possibility for criminals 
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to install other malware on the infected computers to further exploit the victims. Fees are charged for 
this between criminals, generating profits not only from victims, but also from other criminals (Sandee 
2015: 4-5).  
Case studies show that there are at least two types of groups involved in cybercrime: low-tech all-
rounders and high-tech specialists (Leukfeldt et al. 2016a). Although empirical  criminological research 
into cybercriminal networks is scarce, there appears to be some variety in cybercriminal networks. 
Networks can further be characterized by clear differences in low-tech attacks and high-tech attacks. 
High-tech networks typically have more international components. The majority of networks fall into 
the high-tech, international category of networks. Most networks are not restricted to one type of 
cybercrime (Leukfeldt et al 2016b).  
A typical example of a high-tech, international network is the Zeus network.  The network was led by 
two individuals. One of them, a person calling himself Slavik, probably wrote the ZeuS malware (Sandee 
2015: 6). Since 2006, the malware has gone through several revisions and evolutions in which 
functionalities were added (Sandee 2015). In recent years, the ZeuS malware has been very successful 
in executing fraudulent bank transfers in online banking environments (Falliere and Chien 2009). In 
2014 the network had grown to an organization of over fifty people, who were not hierarchically 
organized and did not meet in person. Rather, the criminals worked online on the basis of tasks that 
were outsourced (Krebs 2015). The exploitation of the malware was outsourced to so-called bot 
herders, who manage the botnets mentioned above (Hogben et al. 2011: 15). Infecting computers was 
outsourced to other people. A lot of money was spent on so-called bullet proof hosting providers, to 
keep the servers from which the botnets were controlled out of sight and stable (Sandee 2015: 15). 
The criminals succeeded in exploiting victims all over the world. By establishing themselves in Eastern 
Russia, a working day started with attacking banks in Australia and ended with attacking banks in the 
United States (Krebs 2015). In this way, the cyber criminals generated profits of an estimated 100 
million dollar between 2006 and 2014. In 2014, the FBI dismantled the botnet infrastructure in 
cooperation with private partners (FBI 2014). Slavik is still a fugitive. 
There seems to be a trend in which the organizations exploiting banking malware are becoming more 
professional and people in these organizations have specialized roles within this malware economy 
(Bauer et al. 2008: 8; Hogben et al. 2011; De Graaf et al. 2012: 1; Soudijn and Zegers 2012). In 2016 in 
the Netherlands, there were several cases in which criminals were convicted for being part of an 
organized crime network that used banking malware for fraudulent transactions and subsequent 
money laundering.5 In these cases criminals closely worked together, dividing amongst each other 
technical tasks (like developing the malware, infecting computers and creating an infrastructure) and 
financial tasks (like money laundering). According to Europol, it is likely that in the future there will be 
more loosely organized criminal networks in which individuals gather online on a temporary basis to 
cooperate and commit cybercrimes (Europol 2015b: 11). 
  
 
Laundering banking malware profits  
 
Once the cybercriminals have generated profits with banking malware, they will want to launder the 
profits, in order to conceal the illegal origins and to avoid confiscation. There are many definitions of 
money laundering (Unger 2006: 30-35; Van Koningsveld 2008; Gelemerova 2011: 59), but the essence 
is to avoid attention of police and justice organizations and tax authorities (Kleemans et al. 2002: 127). 
This can be done by avoiding policing technologies (Custers 2015). 
In many situations, money laundering of criminal profits takes place with (combinations of) ‘traditional’ 
money laundering methods. These methods can be straightforward or more complex. A typical 
example of a straightforward money laundering method is to create a (long) series of transactions, 
including several currency exchanges, transfers to other countries and investments in real estate or 
other assets (Kruisbergen et al. 2012: 190-203; Soudijn and Akse 2012). Because of due diligence and 
anti-money laundering legislation in many countries, banks and financial institutions have to notify the 
authorities when transactions or actors are suspicious (Custers 2007). Typically, criminals split 
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transactions to smaller amounts to avoid suspicion and transfer money via countries with less strict 
rules and supervision (Kruisbergen and Soudijn 2015: 13). Another straightforward money laundering 
method is to spend the profits directly on products and services.  
More complex money laundering methods include fictitious turnovers, fictitious gambling profits and 
loan-back constructions (Europol 2015c: 18). Fictitious turnover involves raising the turnover of 
legitimate companies with revenues that do not exist. In this way, legal profits are mixed with illegal 
profits. In a different version of this method, called trade based money laundering, the illegal profits 
are kept within a company for legal international transactions, such as buying products in one country 
and selling them in another country (FATF 2008: 1). Fictitious gambling profits can be created by 
suggesting that profits originate from gambling rather than crime. Although casinos are strictly 
regulated in many countries, online gambling is legal in many jurisdictions. By creating several online 
gambling accounts, criminals can transfer money between these accounts, concealing the origin of the 
profits. In loan-back constructions, criminals also create several accounts (sometimes on fake names 
or for family members) and then lend money to themselves. This can also obfuscate financial trails.  
All these constructions, and combinations thereof, can also be used for laundering the profits of 
cybercrime. In many cases, criminals prefer to generate profits in cash or to quickly exchange their 
profits into cash, as using cash is the easiest to conceal the illegal origin of the profits (Europol 2015c: 
9). In most types of traditional crime, this is not very difficult because the profits are already in cash, 
but the profits of banking malware are usually digital profits, i.e., digital euros, dollar, etc., in an online 
banking environment. Hence, the first step for cybercriminals to launder their profits is to transfer the 
money from this environment to where they want to have it. This may involve also other methods than 
the traditional money laundering methods described above. In this section, we will describe these 
methods. In the first and second subsection we describe two models for laundering the profits of 
banking malware that we could identify in our research, based on the available literature, the police 
files and the interviews. The first model involved the use of so-called money mules and a quick cash-
out. The second model involves the direct spending of the profits in the online banking environment. 
In the third subsection we describe a real case from the police files in the Netherlands that illustrates 
how the money laundering works. 
 
Money mules and cash-out 
 
When cybercriminals gain access to the online bank accounts of their victims via banking malware, 
they can transfer money from the victim’s account to another account. Usually, they do not transfer 
the money directly to their own bank account, as this would make them very easy to trace. Instead, 
the cybercriminals recruit so-called money mules.6 These are people who are willing to provide their 
bank account for a fee (Aston et al. 2009). A typical fee is about 5 % of the total amount that is 
transferred (Europol 2015c: 41; UNODC 2014: 52). For instance, the recruiters may offer them a fee of 
500 euro if they are willing to transfer 10.000 euro via their bank account. After the money is 
transferred from the victim’s account to the money mule’s account, the money mule usually withdraws 
the money from his account via an ATM. This is called the cash-out. In order to ensure the money mule 
does not steal the money, in many cases it is not the money mule but someone else who performs the 
cash-out. This person is also referred to as the casher.7  
The money mule and the cash-out constitute the first stage of the money laundering process (see 
Figure 1). Usually the actions in this first stage are sufficient to constitute money laundering in terms 
of a criminal offence, as illegal profits are processed with the intention of concealing the illegal origin 
of the profits. 
The second stage can consist of all kinds of combinations of money laundering methods to conceal the 
illegal origin of the profits, including the traditional money laundering methods described above. The 
money may be transferred to foreign bank accounts or, after the cash-out, it may be transmitted 
abroad via money transmitting services, spent on luxury goods or transferred abroad in cash. A typical 
method we encountered in the police files and literature is via money transfers with Western Union of 
MoneyGram (UNODC 2014: 20; Europol 2015c: 41).8 Relatively often the money is transferred to 
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Eastern European countries, where local money mules collect the money, without knowledge of the 
illegal origin of the money (UNODC 2014: 20, 53-54; Krebs 2015: 22).9 In practice, the first and second 




Figure 1: Model with money mules and cash-out. 
 
On the basis of the case law and the literature we studied and the police files examined, transferring 
money from the victim’s account to the account of a money mule is the most common approach to 
handle banking malware profits (UNODC 2014: 20).10 However, this method has a significant drawback 
for cybercriminals: each bank has implemented maximum amounts for withdrawals each day (and 
sometimes also each week). Furthermore, the duration of the cash-out period is also maximized, since 
banks block accounts after victims report the crime to the police or to their bank. Banks have also 
implemented other detection methods to rapidly respond to money mules. In short, the amount of 
money that can be laundered with the help of one money mule is limited to a few hundred or a few 
thousand euro. Hence, for the money laundering of large amounts of illegal profits, many money mules 
need to be recruited. After the bank account of a money mule has been blocked, he is unable to open 
a new bank account. Banks usually also report the activities of money mules to the police and they 
may be convicted for money laundering. Reusing money mules may therefore be difficult for 
cybercriminals. 
Cybercriminals partially address this by recruiting money mules abroad, delaying and complicating the 
detection of these money mules and the blocking of their accounts.11 However, organizing large 
numbers of money mules in different countries requires a complex organization that may involve 










The second model (see Figure 2) may appear in three versions: (A) direct purchases of products via 
online shopping, (B) direct purchases of Bitcoins via Bitcoin exchanges, or (C) direct purchases of luxury 
goods. These are discussed below: 
(A) Instead of transferring the money from the victim’s account to the account of a money mule, 
banking malware also allows for the option to order products (and sometimes services) via 
online shopping and pay for this from the victim’s bank account. Obviously, when the products 
are delivered, the cybercriminals do not use their own address, as this would directly lead back 
to them. Money mules are recruited for this.12 In some cases the police found large amounts 
of unopened parcels with game computers. Other products that are purchased include prepaid 
cards, gift cards and credit for mobile phones (see also the Mega Server case discussed below). 
In interviews it was indicated that parcels are often shipped to Eastern European countries. 
The products are sometimes resold for profit. 
(B) In recent years, not only products are purchased in banking malware cases, but also Bitcoins 
are purchased via Bitcoin exchanges, for which payments are made directly from the victim’s 
bank account.13 The Bitcoins can be kept in a Bitcoin wallet that functions like a bank account 
from which cybercriminals can spend something from time to time. Further laundering of 
Bitcoins is explained in Section 5. 
(C) When victims have large amounts of money on their accounts, cybercriminals can use this to 
directly purchase luxury goods, like cars. With the use of Remote Administration Tools (see 
Section 3), cybercriminals monitor the activity on the victim’s computer. When the timing is 
right, a payment can be executed. This method is rather complicated and requires some timing 





Figure 2: Model with direct spending of the profits. 
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In comparison with the first model, the second model allows more time for the criminals to cash out 
money, since it usually takes longer before the money mules are traced, as there are no bank account 
details available to trace them. Hence, it takes a bit longer before the money mules get caught, usually 
via the addresses where the purchases are delivered. The money mules can thus be used by the 
cybercriminal networks for a longer period of time and larger amounts of banking malware profits can 
be laundered per money mule (or, in other words, less money mules need to be recruited for 
laundering the same amount of money). The disadvantage for criminals of model 2A, however, is that 
it still depends on the use of money mules that need to be recruited. Another obvious disadvantage 
for criminals is that the profits are transformed into products rather than money. To the extent that 
the criminals do not consume the products themselves, they need to resell these items, which may be 
time-consuming and yield financial losses. The disadvantage of model 2C for criminals is that it is time-
consuming and requires thorough timing. Model 2B does yield spendable money. The laundering of 
Bitcoins is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
The mega server case 
 
As indicated above, in most banking malware cases several money laundering methods are combined 
to conceal the illegal origin of the profits. To illustrate this, we describe a specific case, the Mega Server 
case, on banking malware in the Netherlands, for which the criminals were convicted by the court of 
Rotterdam in 2015.14 
On 2 October 2015, four suspects were convicted by the court of Rotterdam for possessing and 
acquiring malware, committing computer trespass, theft, scams and money laundering. In the verdict, 
a detailed description is provided of their practices. The banking malware was disseminated via botnets 
in order to infect other computers. After infecting a computer, the malware ensured that the victims 
were shown fake screens, via web injects, that appeared to be the online banking environment the 
victim was used to. After the victims completed their log-in details on the fake screen, the 
cybercriminals obtained these personal details from the victims. Furthermore, mobile phones of 
victims were also infected with tailored malware, in order to intercept text messages the bank used to 
verify bank transfers. 
After obtaining access to and control over the online banking accounts, the criminals transferred the 
money from the victim’s accounts to the accounts of several money mules and cashers. Also, the 
cybercriminals used fake identity documents to open many bank accounts at various banks. The 
banking malware profits were withdrawn from these intermediate accounts via cash-outs from ATMs, 
according to model 1. Subsequently, the money was transferred abroad via Western Union. Also, the 
cybercriminals purchased Bitcoins and prepaid cards (like paysafecards) directly from the victim’s 
accounts, according to model 2. Bitcoins with a total value of 13.000 euros were purchased. These 
actions were qualified as money laundering by the court. For an overview of the methods used, see 
Figure 3. The cybercriminals also used other money laundering methods. For instance, one of them 
created a fake company to receive the banking malware profits. Another applied for a credit card in 
the name of one of his victims. Yet another laundered some of the profits in a casino.  
 




Figure 3: Money laundering methods in the Mega Server Case. 
 
The court stated in its verdict that these are serious crimes, in which Dutch banks were coarsely 
attacked. This damaged, according to the court, the trust in the integrity of the electronic payment 
systems and it might have seriously disrupted social and economic infrastructures. On average, the 
cybercriminals were convicted for terms in prison of two years, of which six months were conditional. 






A description of what Bitcoins are and how the underlying blockchain technology works, is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, in order to describe how money laundering of bitcoins works, we will 
briefly describe the functionality of Bitcoins. For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to consider 
Bitcoin transactions similar to transactions with other currencies. For instance, bitcoins can be 
exchanged for euros or dollar (or vice versa) similar to the way euros or dollars can be exchanged for 
pounds or yens. Exchanging bitcoins usually takes place via Bitcoin exchanges, online financial service 
providers that charge a small fee for each exchange. The major differences between bitcoins (and other 
virtual currencies) and euros, dollar, etc. (so-called fiat currencies) are that bitcoins are decentralized 
(i.e., not issued and supported by a national government) and that bitcoins have no offline, physical 
equivalent (i.e., no cash). As mentioned above, banking malware profits that are turned into bitcoins 
may simply be put in a Bitcoin wallet that serves as a savings account from which cybercriminals can 
spend from time to time. 
Bitcoin wallets are anonymous to some extent, so this may conceal the illegal origin of the profits and 
prevent seizure. However, Bitcoins are based on blockchain technology that uses a public ledger in 
which all transactions can be consulted. As such, all transactions from one Bitcoin account can be 
linked to each other. For this reason, cybercriminals may create several Bitcoin accounts, to prevent 
linkability. When cybercriminals transfer bitcoins between their own accounts, this may indicate a link 
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between these accounts (Nakamoto 2008). Using advanced analysis of transaction data, pseudonyms 
may be clustered to several users (Meiklejohn et al. 2013; Ron and Shamir 2013). The next step is to 
establish real identities behind these pseudonyms. This can be done by employing different sources. 
For instance, when someone mentions his or her Bitcoin address on a website or forum, this may 
enable establishing a real identity (Meiklejohn et al. 2013; Reid and Harrigan 2013). Also, via payment 
details in online shopping information may be retrieved, for instance, shipping addresses and e-mail 
addresses. Reluctant cybercriminals will use anonymization software like Tor.15 However, there are 
also methods to couple Bitcoin addresses to IP addresses that circumvent these anonymization 
techniques (Biryukov et al. 2014). 
A typical way to conceal the illegal origin of Bitcoins is the use of so-called mixing services (also known 
as mixers, blenders or tumblers). These are online services that exchange Bitcoins for Bitcoins, against 
a fee. After a user has submitted the Bitcoins, the mixing service collects Bitcoins from different sources 
(or even mines completely new Bitcoins) and pays them back to the respective user on a different 
account.16 A typical fee is 3 % (Möser et al. 2013: 4). Mixing services are usually only accessible via Tor 
to ensure anonymity of the service provider and its clients (Europol 2015a). As a result, it is often not 
clear in which jurisdiction the mixing services are established. From the police files and interviews it 





In this paper we answered the question: how are the profits of banking malware are generated and 
subsequently laundered? Banking malware is malicious software that aims to steal money from victims 
via manipulated bank transfers in online banking. Via spam people are persuaded to click links or open 
attachments. By doing so, they unknowingly install malicious software on their computers. This 
malware enables cybercriminals to gain illegal access to and control over online banking accounts of 
their victims. The malware uses web injects (i.e., fake screens that look like the online banking 
environment) in which victims complete their log-in details. Behind the screens the amounts and 
details of the beneficiaries are manipulated. This way the bank accounts of the victims are 
compromised. An average of over 700 dollars is extracted from each victim. 
The profits are generated in the form of electronic money, that is subsequently laundered in order to 
conceal its illegal origin and to prevent seizure. We identified two models that are used to launder the 
banking malware profits. The first model focuses on money mules and a quick cash-out. The money is 
transferred from the victim’s bank account to the money mule’s bank account who subsequently 
withdraws the money via an ATM. Next, the money is often transferred abroad via money transfer 
services. The second model involves direct spending from the victim’s bank account. This may involve 
direct purchases of products via online shopping, direct purchases of Bitcoins via Bitcoin exchanges, or 
direct purchases of luxury goods. When bitcoins are purchased they can be laundered further via 
mixing services that exchange bitcoins for bitcoins to further conceal the illegal origin of the banking 
malware profits. All in all, these methods allow criminals to launder profits in relative anonymity and 
prevent seizure of the illegally obtained electronic money.  
The analysis of money laundering methods of banking malware profits presented in this paper provides 
new, unique insights in the ways cybercriminals act in order to be able to enjoy the profits of their 
cybercrimes. However, the methodology used in this research also has some limitations. First, the 
analysis is based on a limited number of interviews and cases. The number of cases investigated is 
constrained by the availability of cases. As a result of the limited material, we are unable to assess the 
prevalence of the described models and to which extent these findings can be applied to other 
contexts. As a result, the analysis remains at a descriptive, qualitative level. In the future, if significantly 
larger amounts of cases become available, quantitative analyses may become possible and perhaps 
even predictive models can be developed and hidden patterns disclosed. 
Second, the focus on expert interviews and cases implies that the scope of this research is limited to 
forms of banking malware and money laundering known to and investigated by law enforcement. 
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There is no knowledge available (nor is it included in this research) about methods that remain invisible 
for law enforcement. 
Third, this research specifically focused on the national context in the Netherlands. As such, the results 
are difficult to extrapolate the findings to cybercrime and cybercriminals in other countries. Although 
cybercrime typically is an international type of crime, in which cybercriminals make practical use of 
limitations caused by jurisdictions of law enforcement agencies, there may be differences in the ways 
cybercriminals and cybercriminal networks from different countries operate. 
Future research should therefore also focus on cybercrime and cybercriminals in other countries. If 
more cases become available, quantitative research becomes possible. Furthermore, future research 
could also focus on the methods to fight cybercrime, particularly banking malware and money 
laundering of cybercrime profits. There already exists research on investigating cybercrime (Oerlemans 
2017) and new technologies in policing (Custers and Vergouw 2015), but knowledge on the usefulness 
and effectiveness of these policing methods is limited. Finally, further research may also be needed on 
how to further empower people to safeguard themselves against cybercrime. From a customer 
perspective, awareness of fraudulent schemes and training in how to apply protective measures are 
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